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THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF. By Robert H. Bork. Basic Books, Inc., 1978. Pp.
xi, 462. Price $18.00.
JAMES R. SILKENAT *
A number of conservative commentators have received critical
acclaim in recent years for the elegance of their argument and the
incisiveness of their thought. William Safire's award winning
column for the New York Times,' James Kilpatrick's newspaper
articles and commentaries on CBS Reports, and of course William
Buckley's various writings and television reports 2 are characteristic
of this burgeoning conservative eloquence. Another name that
should be added to this list of conservative stylists is that of Robert
Bork, Solicitor General under Presidents Nixon and Ford and the
author of a striking new book on government policy, The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself. Bork's new book is also
likely to share another characteristic with the writings of Safire,
Buckley, and the others: it will anger many readers because of its
seeming disregard for facts and factors outside the rigid parameters
of his theory.
Antitrust policy has always been a particularly fertile field for
debate between liberals and conservatives.3 At the grass roots level,
the former view it as a means of protecting the consumer, halting the
concentration of economic power, and curbing predatory business
0 Member of the New York Bar.
'Mr. Safire won a Pulitzer Prize for commentary in 1978.
2 In addition to editing the National Review and producing his television pro-
gram "Firing Line," Mr. Buckley is the author of various books ranging from God
and Man at Yale (1951), to American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth
Century (1970), to Saving the Queen (1976).
3 For an excellent recent example of this ongoing dialogue, see Antitrust
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Anti-
trust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1182 (1977). See also Austin, The Emergence
of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 903 (1972); Brodley, Massive Industrial
Size, Classical Economics, and the Search for Humanistic Value, 24 STANS. L. REv.
1155 (1972); Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50
VA. L. R v. 413 (1964).
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practices; 4 the latter see it as an unnecessary hindrance to efficient
industrialization and business management. 5 Bork's effort is clearly
on behalf of the latter position and is quite systematic in attempting
to poke gaping holes in the fabric of liberal thought. Despite the
popularity of antitrust as a topic of economic discussion, Bork's
initial criticism of the area is that it is an "unknown policy": 6 a
policy of restraint on business certainly, but one based on little
critical understanding of actual practices or business problems.
What is the policy trying to achieve? Who is it trying to help or
to hold back? How broad is its impact? What are its limits?
Finally, what are its real economic consequences?
For Bork the only supportable justification for antitrust policy
is aid to the consumer, the purchaser of goods and services.7 All
other criteria or rationales, such as aid to small business and con-
cerns about concentration, he rejects as being unsupported by legis-
lative history, by sound economics, by society's needs, or by the
words of the actual antitrust laws themselves. Antitrust policy as
currently formulated ignores the role that business efficiency plays
in creating consumer welfare s and thus skews the effects of the law
and leaves us with inapposite economic results. Bork sees his book
as an attempt to "supply the theory necessary to guide antitrust
reform." 9
Bork's approach to antitrust is an almost obsessively systematic
one.'0 The process is one at least ostensibly of logical progression
from point to point, general to specific, problem to solution. After
4 See, e.g., SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: EcoNoMIcs As Ir PEOPLE
MArTEnuD (1973); Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377
(1965); Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE
L.J. 974 (1977); Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Con-
siderations, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1439 (1974).
5 See, e.g., R. PosNHE, ANTITRuST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIE (1976);
THE CoMPETrVE ECONOMY: SELECTED READINGS (Y. Brozen, ed. 1975); Demsetz,
Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in IINUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 164 (Coldschmid, Mann & Weston, eds. 1974).
6 R. BoRK, Tim ANTrUST PARAox: A POLICY AT WAR wrrH ITSELF 3




lo In addition to his ostensible adherence to principles of logic in constructing
his argument, Bork also seems to have a fondness for the military method of




laying out what he views as the misleading historical foundations "
of antitrust from the enactment of the Sherman Act12 in 1890,
through the occasional bright spots and disasters of United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,1 Standard Oil Co. v. United States 14
and Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,15 to the enactment
of the Clayton ' 6 and Federal Trade Commission Acts,1' he at-
tempts to show how these and later developments added harmful
gloss to the purely pro-consumer base of antitrust. This unfor-
tunate gloss amounts, he argues, to the proposition that "efficiency
should sometimes be curbed because of the social and political
health supposedly engendered by the preservation of a sturdy, inde-
pendent yeomanry in the business world." 's Bork finds the effec-
tuation of this policy, as well as its less exotically phrased variants,
beyond the competence of courts.19
His analysis suggests that there are two basic theories under-
lying antitrust law: first, that "[c]ompetitors may agree to remove
the rivalry existing between themselves and thereby injure the com-
competitive process," and second, that "[c]ompetitors may inflict
injury on their rivals and thereby injure the competitive process." 20
Both of these theories, he notes, contain an "important core
of truth," 21 but they have been overextended by courts and
legislatures to cover economic conduct that in fact is pro-consumer
in nature. Bork argues that the law has failed to take account of
the fact that the practices complained of are also sometimes bene-
ficial. The law has really only focused on preserving allocative
11 Bork argues that the early history of antitrust, from 1890 to 1914, contained
the seeds of every major theory prevalent in antitrust today and that the mistakes
in perception of both law and economics made then have clouded our vision even
until today. Bork maintains that "the intellectual history we rely upon is false."
BoRg, supra note 6, at 15-16.
12Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1976)).
13 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
34221 U.S. 1 (1911).
'5246 U.S. 231 (1918).
' 6 Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C.
§12-27 (1976)).
17Pub. L. No. 203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§41-77 (1976)).
18 Bom, supra note 6, at 54.
19 Among the advantages of adhering exclusively to consumer welfare as an
antitrust goal, Bork lists (1) maintenance of the integrity of the legislative process,
(2) establishment of fair warning procedures for businessmen and (3) emphasis on
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efficiency 22 and has denigrated productive efficiency.23  As a conse-
quence, if courts had been consistent in their application of the
accepted theories, he thinks that "not only would competition be
outlawed, but a modern (or almost any) economic system would be
impossible." 24 As a final, summary point on theory, Bork suggests
that the law as presently structured "perceives threats to competi-
tion where none exists." 25 The result is that realistic and indeed
valuable business practices are being destroyed without reason.
I
Once Bork has laid out the problem with antitrust theory, he
methodically proceeds to detail the necessary practical reforms in
current policy. He proposes basic changes in almost every area of
antitrust practice.
In the area of monopoly and oligopoly, Bork maintains that
current attempts to dissolve firms such as IBM and AT&T, which
reached their present size through internal growth, would inflict a
serious economic loss on the consuming public. Any monopolistic
restrictions on output by such firms, while extremely unlikely in
any case, will be met by market entry of firms of equal or greater
efficiency, if such firms exist.26 Therefore, breaking up oligopolistic
firms, as proposed by the Neal Task Force 27 and by Carl Kaysen
and Donald Turner,28 would be largely harmful in its impact be-
cause it would sacrifice efficiency. The same argument leads Bork to
conclude that both United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
29
22 By "allocative efficiency," Bork refers to "the placement of resources in the
economy, the question of whether resources are employed in tasks where consumers
value their output most." Id. 91.
2 3 This term refers to "the effective use of resources by particular firms." Id.
24 Id. 135. Bork maintains that "[v]igorous and consistent enforcement of
present antitrust doctrines would be a national disaster." Id. At this point one
could question whether Bork has abandoned his' efforts at logical consistency: he
criticizes current antitrust policy both for being too narrow in its focus and for
deviating from that focus. A more complete critique of Bork's arguments appears
in the text accompanying notes 41-49.
25 Bo.:, supra note 6, at 160.
26 Id. 178.
27 W'roE HOUSE TAsx FORCE ON ANTrRUsT PoLicy, REPoRT 1 (reprinted in
AN~rCUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Supp. to no. 415, May 26, 1969).
28C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 44-141 (1959). Ralph Nader
has also made this argument concerning General Motors. See Testimony on
Planning, Regulation and Competition in the Automobile Industry, 114 Co-G. REc.
21707-13 (1968).
29 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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and United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.30 were wrongly
decided, in that the courts found bigness alone to be illegal regard-
less of other business factors."'
The equally confused state of current merger policy, he argues,
is also worthy of substantial reform. The nadir in this area,
according to Bork, is the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States.3 2 Although this case has received considerable
attention and criticism elsewhere,33 nowhere has it been dissected
so ruthlessly. In addition to bad economic results, the case pro-
duced bad theory: it "employed the theory of exclusionary practices
to outlaw vertical integration that promised lower prices; the theory
of incipiency to foresee danger in a presumably desirable trend that
had barely started; and the theory of 'social purpose' to justify the
fact that the decision prevented the realization of efficiencies by a
merger which, realistically viewed, did not even remotely threaten
competition." 34
In Bork's view, the only mergers of any kind that should prop-
erly be limited by law are extremely large horizontal mergers in
which the result is that there are three or fewer firms in a particular
market.35 Attacks on vertical mergers he finds especially pernicious
because such mergers are in substance a way of creating efficiency
and not of harming competition.3 6
One current antitrust policy in which Bork finds some value
is the per se limitation on competitors agreeing to limit competi-
tion, as in price fixing and market division cases.37 He thinks, how-
30 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
31 BoP supra note 6, at 165-72.
32370 U.S. 294 (1962). Warren's opinion concluded that the acquisition by
Brown, a shoe manufacturer, of a shoe retailer violated the Sherman and Clayton
Acts even when the market shares involved were around 5 percent. Bork demurs
when deciding whether this is the worst antitrust opinion ever written, but he does
say it has "considerable claim to the title." Born, supra note 6, at 210.
33 See, e.g., E. KmTNER, PRmran or =HE LAW OF MEmms 204-10, 256-58
(1973); R. PosN-R, AwrnusT LAw: AN ECONOMEC PERsPEcv 100-05 (1976);
Adams, Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal Dominance
Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1276 (1974); Bork & Bowman, The
Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 363, 370-73 (1965); Peterman, The Federal
Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co., 18 J.L. & EcoN. 361 (1975).
84 Bonrx, supra note 6, at 216.
85 Id. 221-22.
86 Id. 225-45.
3 7 Bork has praise for United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290 (1897), United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) and United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), among the early
cases, and United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) and United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) among the more recent
cases.
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ever, that these rules should be recast to cover instances where the
restraint involved is "'naked'-that is, only when the agreement
[between rivals] is not ancillary to cooperative productive activity
engaged in by the agreeing parties." 38 To make the proper dis-
tinctions in this area Bork has worked out a rather complicated
test to determine possible harm to the consumer: first, if the inte-
gration involved is essential to the activity to be carried on, such
integration "and the restraints that make it efficient should be
completely lawful"; second, when such integration may be useful
but is not essential, then the enterprise and its "ancillary restraints"
should be lawful only if (a) the parties are cooperating through con-
tract in an economic activity other than the elimination of rivalry,
(b) the collective market share is not too great, and (c) the parties
have not shown a "primary purpose or intent to restrict output." 19
Finally, Bork spends a number of chapters on antitrust policy
with regard to exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, resale price
maintenance, requirements contracts, barriers to entry, group boy-
cotts and individual refusals to deal. He argues that the theories
of automatic exclusion and incipiency upon which the Clayton,
Robinson-Patman and Federal Trade Commission Acts are based
should not be applied in these areas. Instead, exclusionary or fore-
closing practices should only be prohibited when deliberate preda-
tion can be proved.40
In addition to the specific criticisms that he makes of these
various aspects of antitrust law, Bork also has some rather pointed
things to say about the ideological framework surrounding present
policy. He feels quite deeply that an egalitarian ethic (based on
principles of economic leveling) has suffused not only current anti-
trust thinking but the institutions that interpret and implement the
law as well. The problem may have become a social and ideological
one:
To study antitrust at length, to wonder at the manifold
errors of economics and logic displayed, to see that the
errors move the law always in one direction, is to begin
to suspect that a process much deeper than mere mistaken
reasoning is at work. It seems as though the intellectual
terrain is regarded as important not in and for itself but
3 8 Bomr. supra note 6, at 263.
39 Id. 279.
40 Not surprisingly one of the areas that Bork finds rife with possibilities for
predatory activity is the area of misuse of governmental process through bribes, sham
litigation and conspiracies. Id. 347-64.
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as a field of action upon which the political order moves
against the private order.41
Bork finds this underlying commitment to equality through gov-
ernment action, manifested by the bias in favor of antitrust, to be
at least partially the result, not of sound economics or concepts of
personal freedom, but of "intellectual class tastes." 42 He notes in
closing, however, that there is a "new distrust of statist solutions, a
new willingness to reconsider old economic policies and pieties." 43
This is evidenced in part by recent cases and in part by the existence
of a "not altogether insignificant" minority that might agree, "at
least in its general outlines," with the argument of his book.44
Obviously, to Bork, the outcome of the debate over the content of
antitrust policy is "of more than legal interest." 45
III
What is one to make of Bork's arguments? The first response
of most readers, regardless of whether it is positive or negative, is
apt to be an emotional one. As with most adherents to the "Chicago
school" of antitrust 46 (despite the fact that he now teaches at Yale),
Bork's commitment to classical economics will excite some and agi-
tate others.
One area of particular criticism is in his narrow definition of
the goals of antitrust. Proponents of almost all political persuasions
can agree that consumer welfare is an appropriate, even preeminent,
goal of antitrust, but "consumer welfare" in what sense? For Bork
it seems to be "consumer welfare" in the short-run; "consumer wel-
fare" as determined by current prices. He seems to have no con-
cern for, or indeed appreciation of, the effect that significantly
reducing the number of competitors in an area can have. No weight
at all is given to the value of preserving consumer choice, a value
that the antitrust laws may, in part, have been intended to pre-
serve.47 His attack on the concept of incipiency in monopoly and






46 Other prominent professors of this mold include George Stigler, Ward
Bowman, Jr., Aaron Director, Richard Posner, Edward Levi, and Yale Brozen.
47 Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 384 (1965).
48 Bon , supra note 6, at 47-49 & 205-06.
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however, he would allow the unrestricted elimination of firms from
the market so long as at least four remain.49 Even this permissible
level of concentration is a begrudging "tactical concession to current
oligopoly phobia" 50 since Bork is convinced that markets of far
greater concentration are efficient. But Bork, himself, admits that
the evidence is inconclusive as to whether firms in such an oligo-
polistic market can restrict output and control prices even without
explicit price-fixing or other predatory acts.5 1 If he is wrong in his
guess that such price control "probably" does not exist, then his
concession may not be nearly enough to protect "consumer welfare."
Another serious shortcoming of the book is that in constructing
his economic models, Bork excludes from his system several factors
that, on a day-to-day basis, have a persistent impact on business prac-
tice. He deals with "barriers to entry" by denying their existence 
2
and by excluding them from the hypotheticals he uses to make his
arguments. Similarly, he excludes the irrational fears and greedy
conduct of businessmen that persuade them to leave or to enter a
market, the effects of faulty production on business planning, the
incomplete knowledge that consumers have of the products and
services that they buy, and the delay between firm action and re-
action in certain predatory practices.53 In this way, Bork ignores
the actual business facts that he so rigorously promises to consider. 4
This points out both the initial appeal and the shortcoming of
logical arguments based on the theoretical premises and examples
of classical economics: they sound unimpeachable precisely because
they assume away the troublesome points in the analysis.55
In the area of antitrust enforcement, Bork surprisingly does not
discuss the substantive effects that extended and costly antitrust






In discussing the "illogic" of price cutting, for example, Bork ignores the
inflated prices a monopolist or oligopolist may be able to charge after substantial
competition is eliminated or severely reduced. Id. 149.
54 id. 3-11.
551 hope my criticisms of Bork amount to something more than suggesting
merely "that if we would only stop thinking so much about the problem and throw
the book at the bastards our monopoly problem would be solved." Posner, Nader
on Anti-trust: The Closed Enterprise System, NEW REPUBmC, June 26, 1971, at 11,




the proper role of courts in antitrust litigation,5 6 he does not touch
on the many procedural problems (such as delay, judicial control,
use of juries, abuse of discovery techniques) being considered by
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures. 57 One can only speculate as to such a conspicuous ab-
sence. It may be that Bork believed his theoretical message too
important for him to be sidetracked by such obvious realities or he
may believe that the realities are a direct result of the misdirections
of antitrust law that he condemns. In any case, the omission is
regrettable since the strain that antitrust litigation has placed on
both public and private bodies must have implications for future
antitrust policy.
Bork also neglects problems in the area of international anti-
trust such as extraterritorial application, boycott regulations, and
treble damage actions by foreign governments.58
Despite these criticisms Bork's book is not without merit. It
deserves to be read because it demonstrates the importance of busi-
ness efficiency and of proper cooperation among competitors that
government prosecutors have ignored too often in the past. In
particular, he properly denigrates the conception that bigness, even
when obtained through efficiency, is "bad" in some sense or should
be a violation of the antitrust laws. 59
Some of the helpful points he makes, especially regarding the
importance of economics in antitrust analysis, have already been
implemented by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
and by the Federal Trade Commission by means of tremendous
increases in the number and authority of economists within the two
agencies.
As a final comment, it needs to be said that Bork and his Chi-
cago school brethren have a definite contribution to make in their
66 Generally, Bori's point is that courts have assumed too much of the legislative
role. BoRK, supra note 6, at 72-89.
5 T For a concise summary of the work of the National Commission, see DAILY
REP. Exmc. (BNA), July 13, 1978, at A-I to A-8.
58 For a discussion of current concerns in this area, see the interview with
Assistant Attorney General Shenefield in DAm.Y RF.. Exuc. (BNA), Aug. 3, 1978,
at C-1 to C-8. See also Davidow, Recent Developments in International Antitrust, 10
AKRON L. REv. 603 (1977); Fugate, The Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide
for International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT. L. 645 (1977); Jones, Extraterritoriality
in U.S. Antitrust: An International "Hot Potato," 11 INf. L_ wYnn 415 (1977).
59 Bork makes specific references in this regard to the recent government suits
to break up IBM and AT&T and the legislative proposals to dismember General
Motors and the oil companies. BoRK, supra note 6, at 163.
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traditional role as rather ascerbic critics of current policies. Bork's
book has value because it forces consideration of economic and busi-
ness factors that might not be given sufficient weight. His argu-
ments do not, however, lead to the conclusion that the elimination
of most antitrust prosecutions is more likely to help the consumer,
or to produce a better society, than the current practice. Following
all of Bork's prescriptions for policy would be even more myopic
than rejecting all of his complaints."
60 As I have indicated elsewhere with regard to the Chicago school, the rigidity
of Bork's approach produces ineffective "policy-making proposals because it uses
economic analysis as a means of deciding public policy to the exclusion of other
considerations." Silkenat, Book Review (THE CO.MPETITE ECONOMY (Y. Brozen
ed. 1975)) 22 ANTIrrusT BuLL. 241, 243 (1977).
JUDGE LOUIS H. POLLAK
The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review take
pleasure in dedicating this issue to the Honorable Louis H. Pollak,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania. The entire law school community will miss his gentle pres-
ence as dean, especially those who have been fortunate enough to
have been his students. The qualities that made Dean Pollak's
tenure at this law school memorable will continue to serve him well
as a federal judge. We extend our sincere wishes to him for many
fulfilling years on the federal bench.

